In August 2025, the Australian Government announced it had evidence that the Iranian Government had directed violent criminal activities in Australia. The activities were cited as the attacks on two Jewish sites in Australia in 2024. In response to this evidence, the Australian Government expelled the Iranian ambassador and senior diplomatic staff, and will proscribe Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist group in Australia.
Expelling a head of mission from Australia had not been directed in over 80 years, though more junior diplomats have been routinely expelled, which signals the great significance of Iran’s actions as they constitute Foreign Interference in Australia. Before taking these public steps the Australian embassy in Iran was closed and its Australian staff withdrawn as a safety measure, the Australian Government fearing reprisals that might have harmed Australia’s diplomats in Iran.
Australia’s Prime Minister, when announcing Australia’s response to Iran’s Foreign Interference activities, said that Iran had launched an “… attack on Australia …” and “These were extraordinary and dangerous acts of aggression orchestrated by a foreign nation on Australian soil.” Going on to say, “These were attempts to undermine social cohesion and sow discord in our community.”
Under current Australian legislation proscribing the IRGC, which is part of the Government of Iran, means severing formal diplomatic ties with Iran. This is a significant step. It is an appropriate step.
What is Foreign Interference?
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act defines acts of foreign interference as meaning activities relating to Australia that are carried on, by, or on behalf of, are directed or subsidised by, or are undertaken in active collaboration with, a foreign power. Those activities:
- are clandestine or deceptive and:
- are carried on for intelligence purposes;
- are carried on for the purpose of affecting political or governmental processes
- or are otherwise detrimental to the interests of Australia; or
- involve a threat to any person.
Associated with the ASIO Act definition, and ASIO’s role to detect and mitigate Foreign Interference, in June 2018 the Australian Government introduced the National Security Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (EFI Act) tocombat the growing challenge of foreign interference.
The EFI Actamended existing offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and introduced espionage-related offences. Some of the actions EFI criminalised include:
- covert and deceptive or threatening activities by persons intending to interfere with Australia’s democratic systems and processes
- supporting the intelligence activities of a foreign government.
Foreign Interference is different from routine diplomatic influence, known as Foreign Influence, because Foreign Interefrence is hostile to Australia’s sovereignty, values and national interests, and is not conducted in an open or transparent way.
To be a crime under the Criminal Code Act, Foreign Interference must be linked to a foreign government or its proxy (also known as a foreign actor). The IRGC is such a proxy.
Foreign Interference in the Australian community can take many forms, including:
- assault or threats of assault
- blackmail
- kidnapping, unlawful detainment or deprivation of liberty
- stalking and unwanted physical or electronic surveillance
- coercion of an individual by threatening their family or associates overseas to force them to comply
- online disinformation campaigns through social media to discredit an individual or group.
ASIO and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) work together in Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce (CFIT) to identify and disrupt Foreign Interference in Australia. ASIO and the AFP had flagged in January 2025 that “overseas actors” could be involved in attacks on two Jewish sites in Australia in 2024. These attacks seemingly related to Israel’s military operations in the Middle East in response to the terrorist attack and hostage taking by terrorist group Hamas suffered by Israel in October 2023.
Director-General ASIO, Mike Burgess, said at the Prime Minister’s August 2025 press conference announcing the expulsion of the Iranian Ambassador, that Iran had used an international web of intelligence agents and criminal entities to direct, arrange and undertake the attacks in Australia. ASIO and the AFP indicated that Iran may be involved in other acts of anti-Semitic violence in Australia, with investigations continuing.
Previously, in February 2025, Burgess had referred to Iran as a hostile nation, saying “We [Australia] are not immune to hostile nation states, such as Iran, undertaking acts of security concern on our shores or in the near region.”
How do Iran’s actions constitute foreign interference in Australia?
Based on the legislated definition of Foreign Interference noted above, and knowledge of Iran’s history of perpetrating acts of violence internationally over many decades, Pentagram assesses that Iran, as a foreign power, could have directed and enabled clandestine activities that were carried out for the purpose of affecting political or government processes, were detrimental to the interests of Australia, and were threatening and harmful to people resident in Australia.
Let’s consider these points one-by-one.
Foreign power.
Iran, as a nation state, is recognised under international law in a way that defines it as a foreign power from the Australian perspective.
Directed and enabled clandestine activities carried out for the purpose of affecting political or government processes.
ASIO and the AFP reportedly advised the Australian Government they have evidence that Iran directed and funded acts in Australia. ASIO Director-General Burgess said that an international network of Iranian intelligence entities and criminals had collaborated to undertake the acts of violence in Australia.
Iran’s stated longstanding political objective is to extinguish Israel as a state, to be replaced by an Arab state of Palestine, and has promoted and undertaken the killing of Jews (and others) in Israel and beyond. These violent acts of Foreign Interference in Australia were designed, at least in part, to:
- shape the Australian Government’s Israel-related domestic policy and international diplomacy
- enliven the political actions of Iran / anti-Israel supporters in Australia to influence federal and state politicians (noting the Australian federal election in May 2025)
- erode Australia’s support for Israel as a state and for Israel’s military campaign against Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah
- militate for anti-Jewish social fracture in Australia’s society, and
- press the Australian Government to recognise a Palestinian state, which Prime Minister Albanese has said he will do in September 2025 when he attends the United Nations in New York.
Iran has achieved all these objectives through, at least in part, its acts of Foreign Interference in Australia in 2024, and perhaps in 2023 once ASIO and the AFP complete their investigations.
Detrimental to the interests of Australia.
Iran’s acts of Foreign Interference contributed to the Australian Government repudiating almost 80 years of Australian support for the State of Israel through the Australian Government criticising Israel’s military response to being unlawfully attacked by Iranian-sponsored terrorists, Hamas, in 2023.
With ASIO and the AFP indicating that more anti-Israel / pro-Palestine acts of violence in Australia since October 2023 may yet be attributed to Iranian foreign interference, it is clear that Iran’s actions have been detrimental to the interests of Australia. Further, the Australian Government has now positioned itself in opposition to the United States, Australia’s indispensable ally, on the question of recognising a Palestinian state and support for Israel.
Involving a threat to any person.
Iranian Foreign Interference has been a threat to Jews and non-Jews in Australia. People have been coerced, made fearful, and threatened. Many people have not been able to go about their usual business, including schoolchildren and university students. People could have been murdered in the two attacks in 2024 currently attributed to Iran’s foreign interference in Australia. Iran and its intelligence agents have a history of murdering people, be they Jews or others, globally.
Other recent examples of Iranian foreign interference in Australia
In July 2025, Australian media reported on Iranian agents “terrorising” exiled Iranians living in Australia.
Exiled Iranians claimed that they were being pursued, stalked, and had received death threats from Iranian agents operating in Australia. Several of the exiles told Australian media that the Iranian Government monitors their communications, monitors their activities via informants, and have been threatened for condemning the Iranian Government and its leadership. Threats increased in the wake of the U.S. destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.
One exile in Australia told the media “Agents of the Islamic Republic are threatening to kill me and are putting pressure on my family in Iran, saying that if I don’t stay silent, they will harm them.” The exile was approached in September 2024 by an Iranian person against whom he has sought a safety intervention order. The Iranian reportedly yelled at the exile: ”Hezbollah is everywhere and you Zionist pigs will die and have your blood spread all over the world” and whilst yelling this abuse made a throat-cutting gesture towards the exile.
Another exile recounted that she had received online and in-person threats, including being stalked outside her home and being harassed at a petrol station by a man who said he knew where she lived. She was terrified, so much so she moved houses.
The size of the challenge
As of June 2023, Australian Government records showed that almost 86,000 Iranian-born people were living in Australia. Many arrived after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which installed the current political regime in Iran, and also as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s which is estimated to have claimed over 500,000 lives.
With Iran having a population of just over 90 million people it is clear that many of those who have settled in Australia will have extended family still resident in Iran. Through the reign of Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979) and of the ultra-conservative Shia theocracy that replaced him in 1979, people in Iran have been subject to many decades of highly oppressive and extremely violent governance, amplified further during the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s. Accordingly, people of Iranian (Persian) heritage living in Australia understand clearly the level of violent threat posed to their families and friends in Iran on the basis of any anti-Iran stance they may take in Australia. Some are also subject to intimidation and threats as noted on the examples cited above.
The size of the challenge is tens of thousands of people, with Iranian heritage and linkages, in Australia who may be subject to Foreign Interference, from Iranian agents either targeting them in Australia or targeting their connections in Iran. These acts are undertaken in the interests of Iran and are to the detriment of Australia and its people.
Iranian agents may approach people in-person or online. May bully them or offer violence to stop them speaking against the Iranian government. May coerce them to inform on the opinions and actions of fellow Iranian-Australians and permanent residents. In the context of Iran’s anti-Western foreign policies and alignments with Russia, China, and North Korea, may press people to undertake espionage, enable cyber attacks, or to sabotage Australian critical infrastructure or other elements of the Australian economy or government to the detriment of Australia’s interests and to promote an anti-Western geopolitical agenda.
Foreign interference and racism
None of this is to suggest there should be any vilification, or race-based discrimination, in Australia against people with Iranian heritage. Rather, we should be alert to the possible threat these people may be subject to, by dent of their heritage, in order to identify behaviour which may indicate people are being coerced into undertaking actions they would not otherwise do. If people subject to Foreign Interference do come forward seeking assistance, then colleagues, employers, and government officials need to have an appreciation of the possible coercion and cultural conditioning that may have driven these people to behave as directed, as coerced to do.
There is of course the flipside to people being coerced to commit acts of Foreign Interference – there are people willing to assist Iranian authorities in actions of Foreign Interference against Australia.
Willingness can be indicated by a person voluntarily seeking out an Iranian affiliate, either in the Iranian expatriate community or through contact with Iranian diplomats and officials. Willingness can be indicated by taking money to undertake acts of disruption or violence. People willing to undertake acts of Foreign Interference may progress to conducting espionage as an agent – a ‘spy’ or saboteur – acting at the direction of Iranian intelligence officers. People in an organisation who are willing to undertake Foreign Interference by causing harm or disruption to the organisation are insider threats.
Racial heritage is not an indicator of a person being, or likely being, a person who is undertaking Foreign Interference, but it is a factor that should be considered in a personnel security risk assessment. Heritage can be a factor that is exploited by hostile states seeking to coerce or recruit people to undertake Foreign Interference. Other factors can equally be exploited, such as: political views, financial problems, vulnerability to blackmail, gambling addiction, and so on. In assessing a person’s vulnerability, all facets of their persona should be considered to determine their vulnerability to known threats.
Note also that hostile states can attempt to hide their Foreign Interference actions under the cloak of alleged racism. By alleging ‘racism’ they distract from the scrutiny that might uncover their hostile intent and actions.
A key security mitigation in a workplace setting is for the organisation to understand its employees and contractors, appreciate global and Australian domestic events that could impact any employees and contractors, or groups within the workforce, and determine if special attention might be offered to recognise the pressures some people may be subject to, making clear the organisation is alert to these pressures and stands ready to assist if the person asks. This approach delivers both a workforce health and safety and a security outcome by recognising the ‘real world’ drivers that can shape people’s behaviours and actions whilst clearly communicating to the workforce the security situation the organisation is alert to for the safeguarding of people, the broader workforce, and the organisation.
Will Iranian Foreign Interference stop with the expulsion of the Iranian Ambassador?
The departure of the ambassador and senior staff from Australia may be an impediment to Iran’s program of Foreign Interference in Australia, but will not stop it.
Iran has spent decades establishing a network of intelligence agents, co-optees, and criminal affiliates in Australia who will continue to act, in Australia, to the detriment of Australian national interests and people.
The current (since 1979) Iranian Government’s belief in the righteousness of their cause, their worldview based on the Twelver Ja’afari Shia state religion, and their historic and ongoing sectarian violence against Jews and other non-Muslim people all indicate that Iranian Foreign Interference in Australia will continue.
Australian officials noted in early September 2025 that Iran’s likely response is an increase in its already significant cyber attacks on Australian targets. Pentagram assess such attacks will include Australia’s critical infrastructure assets and operations.
Iranian Foreign Interference is a foreseeable risk.
Iranian Foreign Interference and related attacks, be they cyber or kinetic, are foreseeable risks because they have occurred before, and Iran has threatened retaliation. Accordingly, directors and executives need to consider these risks and, moreover, workplace leaders and colleagues need to be attentive to the effectiveness of their entity’s insider threat program which can both protect vulnerable people and also detect and defeat insider threat behaviour linked to Iranian Foreign Interference in Australian workplaces, including in Australia’s critical infrastructure.
