Prologue
More instances of Chinese foreign interference in Australia were made public in August 2025. In this article, Pentagram Advisory (Pentagram) will recount these instances and discuss each case, reflecting on how foreign interference could affect colleagues in your workplace.
It is important to understand that the actions of an adversary nation, such as China, can cause an effect in Australian workplaces. Australia is not remote, is not ‘too far away’ from global events that we are immune from damage.
The growing threat of foreign interference
As context for considering these Chinese foreign interference events, Pentagram cites a report tabled in the Australian Senate in August 2023: Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media. The report included this statement from the Department of Home Affairs:
Foreign interference and espionage are the principal security concern facing Australia. Foreign interference and espionage threaten the things that we value most about our country: our social cohesion, our trusted democracy, and our freedoms. Australia remains a target of sophisticated and persistent foreign interference activities directed towards government, academia, industry, the media and our communities. The nature and scale of the threat we face is complex, and undermines our sovereignty, values and national interests.
The Senate report stated that social media platforms are being used to facilitate the transnational repression of individuals and marginalised communities in Australia.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) observed that the use of social media platforms: “… poses a significant threat to the freedom of Australians, and others residing in Australia, to express their opinion and access online spaces … on social media, this includes online trolling, stalking or harassment, and is typically conducted by authoritarian states to coerce their citizens and others abroad.”
The Senate report also stated that the expatriate communities in Australia most targeted by foreign powers are the Iranian, Tibetan, Ukrainians (by Russia), and Chinese communities.
A victim of Chinese foreign interference, Ms Vicky Xu who is a Chinese-born Australian journalist and policy analyst, told the Senate that:
… I’m still dealing with death threats. I’m still dealing with repeated hacking attempts. Just this week I received a dozen hacking attempts across all of my accounts … I’ve had to adapt the way I live, my lifestyle, to one that’s akin to a criminal, I would say. People in democracies, politicians, academics and people with good social standing tell me things like I’m going to end up in history books, and that all sounds grand, but what about life? I’ll just leave it at that.
The information above makes clear that Foreign Interference, by China and others, does occur in Australia, that the Australian Chinese community is targeted by Chinese authorities, and that Foreign Interference does cause harm to the people who are targeted.
What is foreign interference?
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act 1979 defines acts of foreign interference as meaning activities relating to Australia that are carried on, by, or on behalf of, are directed or subsidised by, or are undertaken in active collaboration with, a foreign power. Those activities:
- are clandestine or deceptive and:
- are carried on for intelligence purposes;
- are carried on for the purpose of affecting political or governmental processes; or
- or are otherwise detrimental to the interests of Australia; or
- involve a threat to any person.
In 2024, ASIO’s Director-General in a public speech said that Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce (CFITF) is particularly adept at using intelligence-led disruptions to stop attempts to monitor and harass members of Australia’s diaspora communities. The Taskforce is based in ASIO, and led by an ASIO officer, but it brings together the capabilities of a range of partners including the Australian Federal Police(AFP).
Since establishment in mid-2020, the Taskforce had (in 2024) conducted more than 120 operations to mitigate foreign interference threats against Australia’s communities, political systems and classified information. Disruptions increased by 265 per cent in recent years and are, according to ASIO, increasing exponentially.
A History of Chinese interference in Australia
The Chinese Government’s efforts, proven or apparent, to conduct foreign interference in Australia through various means, including through in-person contact and social media attack, are not new. For example:
- In 2008, Chinese paramilitary officers accompanying the Olympic torch were warned they will be breaking Australian law if they try to intervene in any pro-Tibet / anti-China protests during the Canberra leg of the Olympic torch relay. Busloads of pro-China supporters were brought to Canberra to oppose the pro-Tibetan protestors.
- In 2009, a federal minister resigned his portfolio allegedly in part due to media reporting of his not declaring two trips to China paid for by a wealthy businesswoman. The minister initially denied receiving anything other than “small gifts” from the China-born family friend, after details of his links to her were leaked to the media, including the undeclared travel but ultimately his position proved untenable.
- In 2017, a federal senator resigned as the accumulation of his questionable ties to Chinese contacts made his continued service in the Parliament impossible.
Recent cases in Australia
The examples cited above indicate that Chinese foreign interference targets include Australia’s politicians in an effort to influence their behaviour with respect to China for the benefit of China, and by implication to the detriment of Australia’s national interests. Also, that the nature of Foreign Interference is to influence not only individual decision-makers but also the broader community and the Australian Government, as shown in the Olympic torch example.
The 2023 Senate Committee cited above was investigating Chinese use of social media to deliver mass influence operations on Australian citizens in general, and to achieve specific outcomes with respect to individual Chinese expatriates. The following examples from August 2025, illustrate this.
Chinese woman targeting Australian Buddhists
On 4 August 2025, the AFP announced that a Chinese national had been charged by the AFP under the CFITF. She stands accused of covertly collecting information about a Canberra Buddhist association on behalf of a foreign principal.
The AFP will allege the woman, who is also an Australian permanent resident, was tasked by the Public Security Bureau of China to covertly gather information about the Canberra branch of Guan Yin Citta, a Buddhist association.
The woman appeared in ACT Magistrates Court, on 4 August 2025, to face one count of reckless foreign interference, contrary to section 92.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, which carries a maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment.
Ted Hui
In August 2025, Hong Kong Government summoned the Australian Consul-General to Hong Kong to protest Australia’s granting of asylum to former Hong Kong Chinese pro-democracy politician Ted Hui. Hui fled from Hong Kong to Australia in 2020 fearing persecution. Hong Kong authorities view Hui as a criminal wanted under Hong Kong’s National Security Law.
Mr Hui is among several activists, now living overseas, burdened in 2023 by Hong Kong Police bounties of $HK1 million ($200,000) each. Hong Kong officials said they reserved the right to ‘pursue’ Hui. Hui has said that “You can’t take away the possibility of someone trying to kidnap me and send me back to Hong Kong or China illegally”.
The Hong Kong Government, and associated pro-China media, have made statements including that for Australia “… to grant Hui asylum was a calculated insult to China and an affront to the rule of law.” Also that “… Canberra has demeaned itself by letting him [Hui] stay.” Finally, on the prospect of Hui being kidnapped and returned to Hong Kong illegally that Hui “… will never know for sure who he can trust or where he can go …he will forever be looking over his shoulder.”
Kevin Yam
A similar instance is the Hong Kong Government’s pursuit of Melbourne-based pro-democracy lawyer Kevin Yam who has been struck off the roll of Hong Kong solicitors.
Mr Yam, who also has a Hong Kong Police $HK1 million bounty on his head, has been the target of anonymous leaflets dropped around Melbourne’s Chinese community calling for him to be kidnapped and taken back to Hong Kong.
Foreign interference beyond Australia: the New Zealand warning
On 22 August 2025, Australian media reported that the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) warned that China is the foreign power ‘most active’ in engaging in foreign interference in New Zealand. This assessment was offered amongst the statements that New Zealand faces the “most challenging national security environment in recent times”.
NZSIS accused China’s United Front Work Department of engaging in foreign interference, citing “… its activities are regularly deceptive, coercive and corruptive …”.
NZSIS reminded the private sector that under China’s national security law all individuals and organisations in China must comply with requests from China’s security and intelligence services. NZSIS said that China had demonstrated both a willingness and capability to undertake intelligence activity that targets New Zealand’s national interests.
What does this mean for your workplace in Australia?
Based on the evidence cited in this article, it is possible that people in your workplace, be they employees or contractors or suppliers, could be the victims of Chinese foreign interference. The objective of the interference could be anything that is detrimental to the person targeted – to cause them and their family harm and / or force them to change their behaviour – or the objective could be larger in a way that is detrimental to the interests of Australia.
Whilst any person, irrespective of their heritage or ethnicity, could be targeted by Chinese foreign interference, the Chinese Communist Party views all ethnic Chinese people, irrespective of how long they or their ancestral family has lived outside China (and Hong Kong), and irrespective of where in the world they live, as having a responsibility to assist Chinese authorities. This mindset is enshrined in Chinese legislation, especially for Chinese commercial enterprises.
Chinese foreign interference is known to have targeted people of Chinese heritage in Australia across the domains of politics, academia, government departments, Defence, and the private sector. By dint of their Chinese ethnicity, Chinese Australians are a more likely target for the unwelcome attention of Chinese government agencies pressing them to undertake foreign influence in support of the Chinese Government’s objectives.
Vicky Xu, Kevin Yam, and Ted Hui have all suffered from Chinese foreign interference, in Australia, that threatened them.
Ted Hui’s case saw Hong Kong Chinese Government officials, and pro-China media, castigate Australian officials and Australia as a nation for granting Hui political asylum, making threats that could be interpreted as Chinese authorities pursuing Hui unlawfully in Australia.
In Kevin Yam’s case the distribution in Australia of pamphlets calling for his kidnapping and return to Hong Kong appears to be an act of foreign interference given what the Hong Kong Government has said about him publicly.
In the case of Chinese national (Australian permanent resident) charged by the AFP and accused of covertly collecting information about a Canberra Buddhist association on behalf of a foreign power – in this case allegedly by the Public Security Bureau of China – she was gathering information to inhibit the freedoms of people to practice their religious faith.
These examples of Chinese foreign interference are in stark opposition to Australia’s freedom of speech and freedom of religious belief.
There could be a person in your workplace who is subject to foreign influence
In terms of Chinese foreign interference, the person pursued may be ethnic Chinese or of another ethnicity. In terms of maintaining a trusted workforce, and also the management of insider threats, we should all be alert to the possibility that a colleague may be suffering coercion from foreign agents who are bullying and threatening them to behave, speak, or act in ways that promote China’s national interests and that are detrimental to Australia’s national interest. In some cases the person will be subject to the threats of harm either to them directly or, as is known to be the case in Chinese foreign interference, to family members living in China.
Being alert to Chinese foreign interference in the workplace is being alert to a real threat, perhaps a likely threat in your work setting. The matter needs to be treated with sensitivity given the possible race-based biases that could arise, noting those nations who pursue foreign interference will play the ‘race card’ in an effort to disguise their clandestine actions. However, foreign interference has only one racial factor, that a foreign power will target people for coercion and harm based on their ethnicity along with other factors such as their religion, political affiliation, social views and other factors which the foreign power finds objectionable.
The goal of a foreign power interfering in Australia is to harm Australia, often stoking social fracture and undermining Australia’s national security in small and large ways. Be alert in your workplace to possible victims of foreign interference because, even though they are victims, they may have no choice but to cause harm, and that risk must be addressed.
Recognising and responding in the workplace
Foreign interference is not only a national security problem, but it can also surface inside workplaces in subtle and damaging ways – recognising and responding early is critical.
Signs that a colleague may be under coercion or pressure can include:
- Sudden behavioural changes, such as withdrawing from usual work patterns or avoiding certain topics.
- Indications they are being monitored or harassed online or in person.
- Unusual requests for sensitive information without a clear business reason.
- Expressing fear for their own safety or that of their family overseas.
How workplaces can respond:
- Raise awareness. Provide staff with training on foreign interference risks, including how adversary nations can target people regardless of their heritage or background.
- Encourage safe reporting. Establish confidential channels for employees to report concerns without fear of judgement.
- Support but do not stigmatise. Build trust. Emphasise that people subject to foreign interference are being coerced and require protection, not suspicion. Avoid assumptions based on ethnicity or political views.
- Engage with authorities. If interference is suspected, seek advice from ASIO, AFP, or sector regulators. Early reporting can prevent escalation and protect the welfare of the person targeted.
- Strengthen security culture. Review insider threat management, information security, workforce security culture, and workforce assurance processes to reduce opportunities for coercion.
Conclusion: stay alert, support colleagues
Foreign interference is designed to divide communities, undermine trust, and cause harm to Australia’s national interests. It can also directly affect individuals in the workplace – colleagues who may be targeted, threatened, or coerced by foreign actors.
For boards and executives the challenge is twofold: to stay alert to the risks, and to support those who may be victims. Sensitivity is essential – vigilance must never tip into racial bias or unfounded suspicion. The real issue is not identity but coercion: people, regardless of their heritage, can be pressured to act against their will.
The goal for workplaces is to foster an environment where staff feel safe, supported, and able to speak up. By combining vigilance with compassion, organisations can reduce risks, protect their people, and contribute to Australia’s resilience against foreign interference.
Chinese foreign interference in Australia is real, and it is happening today. There is no foreseeable reason for the Chinese Government to stop its foreign interference activities and so this is an obvious and foreseeable risk that directors, executives and workplace leaders need to acknowledge and mitigate for the benefit of all Australians.
